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Case No. 20050707-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant appeals from an order revoking probation and committing him to 
the Utah State Prison, in the Seventh Judicial District Court, San Juan County, the 
Honorable Lyle R. Anderson presiding. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (West 2004). 
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue. Does this Court's holding that the exclusionary rule "does not apply in 
the context of probation revocation proceedings" foreclose defendant's claim that 
the court should have excluded evidence in his probation revocation proceeding? 
Standard of Review, Factual findings underlying the trial court's decision to 
grant or deny a motion to suppress evidence are reviewed under a clearly erroneous 
standard; conclusions of law based on those findings are reviewed for correctness. 
State v. Alverez, 2005 UT App 145, | 8. Application of law to underlying factual 
findings in search and seizure cases receives "non-deferential review/7 State v. 
Brake, 2004 UT 95, If 15,103 P.3d 699. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
U.S, CONST,, amend, IV 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, 
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath 
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and 
the persons or things to be seized. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged by information with one count of aggravated robbery, 
a first degree felony, and two counts of aggravated assault, a third degree felony. 
R. 1-2. He pled guilty to one count of attempted aggravated robbery, a second 
degree felony, and one count of aggravated assault, a third degree felony. R. 18-26. 
He received concurrent prison terms. R. 28. However, these were stayed and 
defendant was placed on probation for 36 months. R. 28-29. 
Four months later, the prosecutor filed a motion and affidavit alleging that 
defendant had violated the terms of his probation by (1) failing to complete 
treatment; (2) failing to seek or maintain full-time employment; (3) failing to report 
as required; and (4) using marijuana. R. 34-35. At a revocation hearing, defendant 
admitted the allegations. R. 42. His probation was revoked and reinstated. Id. 
2 
Six months later, the prosecutor filed another motion and affidavit alleging 
that defendant had violated his probation terms by possessing a firearm. R. 47-49. 
Defendant sought to suppress evidence obtained in the stop of his vehicle. R. 
68. After hearing evidence, the trial court denied his motion, revoked probation, 
and committed him to prison. R. 70-71, 79: 34. Defendant timely appealed. R. 74. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Dorothy Phillips called in a complaint about defendant. R. 79:11,18-20. She 
said that defendant had harassed his girlfriend and that he was concealing a gun in 
the cup holder of his car. R. 79:10-11,17-20. Officer Lambert Teschini received the 
call. He asked her if defendant had used the gun on her; she said "No/7 adding, 
"But there's a gun in his car." R. 79: 20-21. She said, "He always carries a weapon 
with him all the time." R. 79: 23. The girlfriend was staying at the Blanding 
Women's Shelter. R. 79:19. 
The first officer on the scene hesitated to go over to defendant's house out of 
cuncern that defendant "might have a weapon and barricade himself in." R. 79:10, 
19. When Officer Teschini arrived, they went to the house that Phillips identified as 
defendant's location. R. 79:10. Defendant was inside and would not come out. R. 
79:10,24. With the owner's permission, the officers used a knife to pry open the 
door, went in, and talked to defendant. R. 79:10, 26. Defendant was cooperative 
and not intoxicated. R. 79:10. He said, "Go ahead. Search the car." R. 79:11, 24. 
3 
The officers searched the vehicle. Inside, the cup holder did not appear to be 
removable, but appeared to be integral to the center console. R. 79: 11-12. They 
found no gun. R. 79:11. Defendant was allowed to leave. R. 79:11-12. 
Teschini walked to Dorothy Phillips's house and informed her that there was 
no gun in the compartment. R. 79: 12, 26. She replied that the cup holder was 
removable and the gun was underneath it. R. 79:12,14. She feared that defendant 
might come back and use it. R. 79:14. She also told Teschini that defendant was on 
probation. R. 79:17. 
Teschini got into his car, turned on his overhead lights, and pulled defendant 
over. R. 79:12. It had been about one minute since defendant had been permitted 
to leave. R. 79: 27. Teschini told defendant that he had not checked one area and 
asked defendant to get out of his car. R. 79: 12. Defendant complied, saying 
nothing. R. 79:12,15. 
Teschini "kind of jiggled" the cup holder and pulled it up, revealing some 
"electronic stuff." R. 79: 15. At first the officer saw no gun, but looking further 
down he found a firearm. R. 79:16. He took it "for safe keeping" and turned it over 
to an FBI agent. R. 79: 27-28. He had by then been informed that defendant was 
"not supposed to have a gun." R. 79: 28. In fact, defendant's probation agreement 
prohibited him from possessing a firearm. R. 79: 29. 
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The FBI agent reported that defendant had earlier been injured in a "shoot-out/' 
but the person who shot him in the knee was not prosecuted, as the shooting was 
determined to have been in self-defense. During that incident defendant was 
holding the very firearm retrieved from under his cup holder. R. 79: 36. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant acknowledges that the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule does 
not apply in probation revocation hearings, but for the first time on appeal seeks a 
bad faith exception to that principle. This claim should be rejected as unpreserved. 
In any event, it lacks merit. In Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole v. Scott, 
524 U.S. 357 (1998), the United States Supreme Court held that the exclusionary rule 
does not apply in parole revocation proceedings because they are not criminal trials. 
In State v. Jarman, 1999 UT App 269, % 7, 987 P.2d 1284, this Court followed Scott, 
holding that, because probation revocation hearings are not criminal trials, the 
exclusionary rule does not apply. 
These cases foreclose defendant's claim that the exclusionary rule should apply 
in probation revocation proceedings. Neither Scott nor Jarman permits exclusion on 
a showing of police bad faith. Moreover, no jurisdiction has, post-Scoff, adopted the 
bad faith exception defendant advocates here. 
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ARGUMENT 
DEFENDANTS CLAIM THAT THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
EXCLUSIONARY RULE MAY APPLY IN PROBATION 
REVOCATION PROCEEDINGS IS FORECLOSED BY CASE LAW 
FROM THIS COURT AND THE UNITED STATES SUPREME 
COURT 
Defendant acknowledges that this Court has held that "the exclusionary rule 
to the Fourth Amendment does not apply in the context of probation revocation 
proceedings/7 Br. Aplt. at 13 (citing State v. Jarman, 1999 UT App 269, ^  7, 987 P.2d 
1284). Nevertheless, he asks this Court to reverse the trial court's order by reading 
a bad faith exception into this settled rule. Br. Aplt. at 25.1 Defendant would apply 
this exception "where the officer's bad faith conduct was the only purpose behind 
the stop and search" of the defendant's vehicle. Id. This claim is unpreserved and 
lacks merit. 
A. This claim is not preserved. 
This Court should not reach defendant's claim because he did not preserve it 
in the trial court and does not argue plain error or exceptional circumstances on 
appeal. 
Controlling law, "Before a party may advance an issue on appeal, the record 
must clearly show that it was timely presented to the trial court in a manner 
1
 Although defendant cited the Utah Constitution in his written motion in the 
trial court, R. 68, he places no reliance on it on appeal. See, e.g., Br. Aplt. at 8. 
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sufficient to obtain a ruling thereon." Buehner Block Co. v. UWCAssocs., 752P.2d892, 
894 n.2 (Utah 1988). "[T]he grounds for the objection must be distinctly and 
specifically stated," State v. Johnson, 774, P.2d 1141,1144-45 (Utah 1989), and made 
in a "fashion calculated to obtain a ruling thereon." Doe v. Hafen, 772 P.2d 456,458 
(Utah App. 1989), cert denied, 800 P.2d 1105 (1990) (quoting Barson v. E.R. Squibb & 
Sons, Inc., 682 P.2d 832, 837 (Utah 1984)). That is, the objection must "be specific 
enough to give the trial court notice of the very error . . . complained of." Beehive 
Med. Elecs., Inc. v. Square D Co., 669 P.2d 859, 860 (Utah 1983). 
Utah courts "have consistently held that a defendant who fails to preserve an 
objection at trial will not be able to raise that objection on appeal unless he is able to 
demonstrate either plain error or exceptional circumstances." State v. King, 2006 UT 
3, f 13, 543 Utah Adv. Rep. 23 (citations omitted). Where an appellant "does not 
argue that 'exceptional circumstances' or 'plain error' justifies a review" of 
unpreserved issues, the appellate court will "decline to consider [them] on appeal." 
State v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226,1229 n. 5 (Utah 1995). 
Proceedings below. Defendant's two-sentence motion to suppress assumed 
his right to the remedy of suppression. See R. 68. At the evidentiary hearing, 
defense counsel acknowledged that he had researched the question and could find 
no case support for the position that the court could suppress evidence in a 
probation revocation proceeding. R. 79:8,31. He did not argue that the police acted 
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in bad faith or that, if they had, it would alter the exclusionary rule analysis. See R. 
79: 30-35. In fact, he did not mention bad faith. See R. 79: 41-42. 
The court ruled that the remedy of suppression is not available in probation 
revocation hearings. R. 79: 34. It thus did not address the secondary question of 
whether the officer had probable cause to stop defendant, and of course did not 
make any ruling or finding related to bad faith. Id. 
Analysis. On appeal, defendant claims that the rule that suppression is not an 
available remedy in probation revocation proceedings should be subject to a bad 
faith exception. However, this claim was not "distinctly and specifically stated" 
below, Johnson, 774 P.2d at 1144-45, nor was it presented in a "fashion calculated to 
obtain a ruling thereon/7 Doe, 772 P.2d at 458. 
Nothing that defendant said would have given the trial court notice of the 
"very error" of which he now complains. Beehive Med. Elecs., Inc., 669 P.2d at 860. 
On the contrary, he informed the court that his research disclosed no authority 
supporting his request that the court invoke the exclusionary rule to his probation 
revocation proceeding. He does not argue plain error or exceptional circumstances. 
See Br. Aplt. a t l . 
Accordingly, his claim is unpreserved and this Court should not reach it. 
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B. This claim fails on its merits. 
Defendant argues that the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule should apply 
in probation revocation proceedings where the police are shown to have acted in 
bad faith. Yet he acknowledges that this Court has previously held that "the 
exclusionary rule to the Fourth Amendment does not apply in the context of 
probation revocation proceedings." Br. Aplt. at 13 (citing Jarman, 1999 UT App 269, 
Tf 7). Furthermore, he states that he "does not attempt to overturn the standing 
p receden t s ] . . . as to the Fourth Amendment's application to probation revocation 
proceedings." Br. Aplt. at 8. Those precedents contain no bad faith exception. 
Defendant's claim thus fails. 
In Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357 (1998), the 
United States Supreme Court held "that the federal exclusionary rule does not bar 
the introduction at parole revocation hearings of evidence seized in violation of 
parolees' Fourth Amendment rights." Id. at 364. The Court noted that "because the 
rule is prudential rather than constitutionally mandated, we have held it to be 
applicable only where its deterrence benefits outweigh its 'substantial social costs.'" 
Id. at 363 (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 907 (1984)). And because the 
exclusionary rule "precludes consideration of reliable, probative evidence, it 
imposes significant costs: [i]t undeniably detracts from the truthfinding process and 
allows many who would otherwise be incarcerated to escape the consequences of 
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their actions/7 Id. at 364. In addition, "[amplication of the exclusionary rule would 
both hinder the functioning of state parole systems and alter the traditionally 
flexible, administrative nature of parole revocation proceedings/7 Id. 
Stating that "we are asked to extend the operation of the exclusionary rule 
beyond the criminal trial context," the Court declared, "We again decline to do so." 
Id. See also United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974) (holding the Fourth 
Amendment exclusionary rule inapplicable to grand jury proceedings). 
The Court rejected the lower court's approach, which permitted exclusion 
where the officer "knows that the subject of his search is a parolee." Scott, 524 U.S. 
at 367-68. The Court noted that "such a piecemeal approach to the exclusionary rule 
would add an additional layer of collateral litigation regarding the officer's 
knowledge of the parolee's status." Id. at 368. 
The following year, in State v. Jarman, 1999 UT App 269, 987 P.2d 1284, this 
Court applied Scott to probation revocation proceedings. It reasoned that," [ljike the 
Pennsylvania proceeding at issue in Scott, Utah probation revocation proceedings 
are civil in nature." Id. at ^ 7. See State v. Hudecek, 965 P.2d 1069,1071 (Utah App. 
1998) ("Probation revocation proceedings are civil in nature.. ."); State v. Hodges, 798 
P.2d 270,278 (Utah App.1990) ("' [T]he proceeding for revocation of probation is not 
a criminal prosecution/. . . [T]he standard to be used in proving a violation of a 
condition of probation is a preponderance of the evidence."); see also Petersen v. Utah 
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Bd. of Pardons, 907 P.2d 1148,1154 (Utah 1995) (" A parole revocation proceeding is 
a civil proceeding..."). The Court thus concluded that "the exclusionary rule to the 
Fourth Amendment does not apply in the context of probation revocation 
proceedings." Jarman, 1999 UT App 269, f 7. See also A.R. and C.P. v. C.R., 1999 UT 
43, H19,982 P.2d 73 (holding the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule inapplicable 
to child protection proceedings). 
Jarman controls. "Horizontal stare decisis . . . requires that a court of appeals 
follow its own prior decisions." State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393,399 n.3 (Utah 1994). 
See also State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256,1269 (Utah 1993) (holding "stare decisis has 
equal application when one panel of a multi-panel appellate court is faced with a 
prior decision of a different panel"). However, horizontal stare decisis does not 
"require that a panel adhere to its own or another panel's prior decisions with the 
same inflexibility as does vertical stare decisis." Menzies, 889 P.2d at 399, n.3 (citing 
Opsal v. United Sews. Auto Ass' n, 2 Cal. App.4th 1197,10 Cal. Rptr.2d 352,356 (1991); 
State v. Dungan, 149 Ariz. 357, 361, 718 P.2d 1010,1014 (1986)). "Instead, although 
it may not do so lightly, a panel may overrule its own or another panel's decision 
where 'the decision is clearly erroneous or conditions have changed so as to render 
the prior decision inapplicable/" Id. (citing Dungan, 149 Ariz, at 361, 718 P.2d at 
1014). 
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Defendant has not demonstrated that Jarman is clearly erroneous or that 
conditions have changed so as to render it inapplicable. On the contrary, he "does 
not attempt to overturn the standing precedents] . .'.as to the Fourth Amendment's 
application to probation revocation proceedings . . ." Br. Aplt. at 8. 
The attempt would be futile in any event. Jarman was and remains a correctly 
decided case. It put Utah among "the great majority of jurisdictions" taking the 
view that evidence obtained as a result of an unreasonable search and seizure "is 
admissible in a probation revocation hearing even though it would not be 
admissible in a criminal prosecution to determine guilt." Phillip E. Hassman, 
Annotation, Admissibility, in State Probation Revocation Proceedings, of Evidence 
Obtained Through Illegal Search and Seizure, 77 A.L.R.3d 636 (2006). 
Nor has time tarnished Jarman's vitality. Defendant cites several cases that flirt 
with the concept of excluding evidence in probation proceedings where police are 
guilty of bad faith or harassment, but few if any actually ordered evidence excluded. 
See Br. Aplt. at 21-22 (citing, e.g., United States v. Farmer, 512 F.2d 160,162 (6th Cir. 
1975) ("This case does not involve harassment by the police so that an exclusion rule 
should be invoked to prevent recurrence"); United States v. Brown, 488 F.2d 95, 95 
(5th Cir. 1973) (per curiam) (finding "inadequate evidence of police misconduct or 
harassment to support an application of the exclusionary rule"); People v. Atencio, 
525 P.2d 461, 463 (Colo. 1974) (declining to apply the rule that "where the 
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unreasonable search or seizure is such as to shock the conscience of the court, the 
court will not permit such conduct to be the basis of a state-imposed sanction"); 
Anderson v. Commonwealth, 470 S.E.2d 862, 863 (Va. 1996) (holding that "the 
exclusionary rule is not applicable in a probation revocation proceeding absent a 
showing of bad faith on the part of the police/' but finding no bad faith in that case); 
State v. Proctor, 559 P.2d 1363,1364 (Wash. App.), review denied, 559 P.2d 1363 (Wash. 
1977) (remanding for hearing on question of government misconduct)). 
These pre-Scott cases were all effectively overruled by Scott. After Scott, no 
court has invoked a bad faith exception. Scott rejected "such a piecemeal approach 
to the exclusionary rule " because it "would add an additional layer of collateral 
litigation" outside the context of the criminal trial itself. Scott, 524 U.S. at 367-68.2 
Defendant has cited no post-Scott case, and the State is aware of none, adopting a 
bad faith exception to the rule that the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule does 
not apply in probation revocation proceedings. 
2
 One rogue court has distinguished Scott and held that the Fourth 
Amendment exclusionary rule applies in probation revocation proceedings. In a 
two-page per curiam decision, the Florida Supreme Court refused to apply Scott to 
probation revocation proceedings. See State v. Scarlet, 800 So.2d 220 (Fla. 2001) (per 
curiam), cert, denied, 535 U.S. 922 (2002). Three of the seven justices dissented on the 
ground that Scott made clear that the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule did not 
apply "beyond the criminal trial context," and that "[a]U agree that a probation 
revocation hearing is not a criminal trial." Id. at 223 (Wells, C.J., dissenting) (citation 
omitted). Police bad faith or misconduct played no part in the decision. 
13 
This case is controlled by Scott and Jarman. In Scott, a parole revocation case, 
the Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule does not 
apply outside the criminal trial context. In Jarman, a probation revocation case, this 
Court correctly viewed Scott as controlling and held that the Fourth Amendment 
exclusionary rule does not apply in probation revocation proceedings. Jarman is 
clearly correct. 
Therefore, even if defendant's claim were properly before this Court, it would 
fail on the merits. 
CONCLUSION 
The district court's order revoking defendant's probation should be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted on _]_ March 2006. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General 
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